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Abstract
The prominent role of monetary policy in the U.S. interwar depression has
been conventional wisdom since Friedman and Schwartz [1963]. This pa-
per presents evidence on both the surprise and the systematic components
of monetary policy between 1929 and 1933. Doubts surrounding GDP esti-
mates for the 1920s would call into question conventional VAR techniques.
We therefore adopt the FAVAR methodology of Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz
[2005], aggregating a large number of time series into a few factors and
inserting these into a monetary policy VAR. We work in a Bayesian frame-
work and apply MCMC methods to obtain the posteriors. Employing the
generalized sign restriction approach toward identification of Amir Ahmadi
and Uhlig [2008], we find the effects of monetary policy shocks to have
been moderate. To analyze the systematic policy component, we back out
the monetary policy reaction function and its response to aggregate supply
and demand shocks. Results broadly confirm the Friedman/Schwartz view
about restrictive monetary policy, but indicate only moderate effects. We
further analyze systematic policy through conditional forecasts of key time
series at critical junctures, taken with and without the policy instrument. Ef-
fects are again quite moderate. Our results caution against a predominantly
monetary interpretation of the Great Depression.
JEL codes: N12, E37, E47, E52, C11, C53
Keywords: Great Depression, monetary policy, Friedman/Schwartz hypothesis,
Bayesian FAVAR, Dynamic factor model, Gibbs sampling
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1 Introduction
Beginning with the seminal contribution of Friedman and Schwartz [1963], the
Great Depression has traditionally been associated with restrictive monetary pol-
icy. In 1928, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, then the leading institution
in U.S. monetary policy, responded to the stock market boom with interest rate
hikes from 3.5 % in January to 5 % in September. Between July and October of
1929, it raised its discount rate by another percentage point. After the October
stock market crash, the discount rate was reduced in several steps to reach 1.5
% in June 1931. However, given the rapid decline in price levels, ex-post real
interest rates remained high. Monetary authorities also failed to intervene in the
banking crisis that unfolded beginning in December of 1930, and interest rates
increased again after Britain’s departure from the Gold Standard in October,
1931.
This paper is about submitting the role of monetary policy in the Great De-
pression hypothesis to empirical test. This task is a complex one, as several
different channels of monetary policy transmission during the depression have
been proposed. The strongest form of the paradigm, expounded by Schwartz
[1981], states that both the initial recessionary impulse and the later deepen-
ing of the recession were largely caused by the Federal Reserve. The original
position of Friedman and Schwartz [1963] centered more strongly on the role
of monetary policy in deepening the slump. This weaker version of the mon-
etary paradigm is also consistent with the emphasis placed on bank panics by
Bernanke [1983,1995] and others. Bernanke’s research focused on financial chan-
nels of monetary policy transmission, emphasizing the role of information asym-
metries and participation constraints in debtor/creditor relations, as well as of
debt deflation. Bernanke and Carey [1996] also looked at nominal wage stick-
iness as an alternative mechanism of monetary policy transmission during the
depression.
In the light of these various proposed transmission mechanisms, traditional
VAR analysis soon reaches its limits, as it only allows for a small number of
time series to model the pertinent dynamics of the money/income causation.
One alternative that has been pursued in the recent literature was to obtain
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counterfactuals from well-specified DSGE models of the Great Depression that
focus on one specific monetary transmission mechanism. Bordo, Erceg, and
Evans [2000] specify a DSGE model with sticky wages, finding evidence in favor
of a nominal wage rigidity channel of monetary policy transmission. Christiano,
Motto and Rostagno [2003] propose a DSGE model with a permanent increase in
liquidity preference during the depression, and argue that given this preference
shift, easy monetary policy a la Friedman and Schwartz would have mitigated
most of the slump.
However, non-monetary interpretations using DSGE techniques seem to have
worked equally well in modeling the interwar depression. Cole and Ohanian
[2005] specified a model of collective wage bargaining to argue that real wage
rigidity under the New Deal prevented a more complete recovery from the de-
pression after 1933. Combining monopolistic product markets with search fric-
tions in the labor market, Ebell and Ritschl [2007] argued that the Great Depres-
sion could be viewed as an equilibrium shift, induced by high wage policies un-
der the Hoover administration. In a model of international business cycle trans-
mission in the Great Depression, Cole, Ohanian, and Leung [2005] examined
monetary policy and productivity shocks alongside each other, and found only
a minor role for monetary shocks in explaining the slump. Chari, Kehoe and Mc-
Grattan [2007] modeled the Great Depression using a neoclassical business cycle
accounting framework with frictions. On the other extreme of the spectrum of
non-monetary models, Harrison and Weder [2005] calibrated a sunspot model
of investor behavior, and found strong evidence for an investment-led downturn
that was unrelated to monetary policy. Hence, existing research offers a whole
menu of interpretations which all seem consistent with the data, although they
partly exclude each other.
This is what motivates the approach taken in the present paper. Compared
to existing research on the Great Depression, we aim to impose less structure
and at the same time analyze a richer dataset. We start out from parsimonious
yet informative prior assumptions on the effects of monetary policy. We gear
our estimation toward exploiting the information on the common components
of business cycle movements in a large cross section of time series. To this end,
we employ the factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) techniques in-
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troduced into monetary policy by, among others, Bernanke and Boivin [2003],
Stock and Watson [2005] and Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz [2005] (henceforth
BBE). The idea behind this can be interpreted as augmenting the information
content in a VAR by a two-step procedure. In a first step, the common dynamics
in a large panel of time series are identified using dynamic factor model (DFM)
techniques as developed by Geweke [1977] and Sims and Sargent [1977]. In a sec-
ond step, the causality between a properly chosen policy instrument and some
representative measure of economic activity is examined in a traditional VAR,
including the factors as the relevant description of the underlying economic dy-
namics. Estimation is either in two steps, employing principal-component tech-
niques for DFM part and Maximum Likelihood for the FAVAR, or simultaneous
by Bayesian likelihood methods or suitable numerical approximations. In the
present paper, we adhere to the Bayesian approach, which allows us to exploit
the information on the observables in the VAR specification more completely.
Both traditional VAR analysis and FAVARs for U.S. data have obtained sig-
nificant but quantitatively small effects of monetary policy on output. In a long-
term study on the U.S. since the 1930s, Sims [1999] finds that monetary policy
on average explains around 12 % of forecast error variance in output. Using the
FAVAR technique, Amir Ahmadi and Uhlig [2008] report a variance explanation
of less than 14 % for industrial output and roughly 10 % for unemployment,
order flows, and capacity utilization, evaluated at a 48-months horizon.
VAR evidence on the Great Depression is sparse. Ritschl and Woitek [2000]
employ time-varying techniques on four different specifications of the monetary
transmission mechanism and find that monetary policy explains less than 5 %
of output forecast error variance. They also find the forecasting performance of
their VARs to be poor. This suggests that a traditional monetary policy VAR,
run with the imperfect aggregate data available for the interwar period, might
not be able to capture the business cycle dynamics of the Great Depression very
well. Given the limitations to data quality in the interwar period, working in a
FAVAR framework thus seems particularly promising, as the underlying DFM
aggregates information included in a large panel of disaggregate time series. The
statistical aggregation procedure implicit in the FAVAR presents an alternative
to historical monetary statistics and reconstructed national accounts with their
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unavoidable interpolations and inaccuracies.
The aim of the present paper is to track the effects of U.S. monetary policy
during the interwar years in the data-rich environment provided by the FAVAR
approach, and to evaluate them against the postwar evidence collected in previ-
ous studies. The Friedman/Schwartz [1963] hypothesis on the monetary causes
of the Great Depression would suggest that the effects of interwar monetary
policy were significant and certainly larger than the rather modest estimates
obtained for postwar U.S. data. Any findings that suggest only minor effects
of monetary policy would then have to be interpreted as cautioning against a
primarily monetary explanation of the Great Depression.
The task at hand is a double one. On the one hand, we follow the standard ap-
proach to policy analysis in a VAR, calculating impulse response sequences and
forecast error variance decompositions under identifying assumptions about the
correlation structure of the VAR residuals. The implicit assumption behind this
approach is the neutrality of anticipated monetary policy changes, i.e. of move-
ments along the central bank’s reaction function. On the other, we also attempt
to trace possible systematic effects of monetary policy, which would be present
under a wider set of frictions that allow for (however short-lived) deviations
from non-neutrality of movements along the monetary policy reaction function
itself. In a VAR, such systematic effects would be identified through Granger
causality of monetary policy for other variables of interest. We implement this
by taking Bayesian forecasts of key economic indicators from FAVARs with and
without past realizations of the policy instrument. Improvements of the forecast
in the presence of the policy instrument relative to the baseline would then be
an indication of possible systematic policy effects, while the sign of the correc-
tion would indicate the expansionary or recessionary stance of systematic policy.
This is the closest we can get to providing a test of monetary policy effects in
the spirit of Friedman and Schwartz’ [1963] hypothesis. Furthermore we iden-
tify the reaction of different policy instruments to aggregate supply and demand
shocks tracing the systematic reaction of the monetary authority to changes in
the economy.
We proceed in several steps. Section (2) presents the basic econometric frame-
work, which closely follows the Bayesian version of BBE’s FAVAR model. Sec-
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tion (3) describes the estimation procedure and Section (4) discusses the model
fit. Section (5) provides results for the stochastic component of monetary policy,
obtaining shocks from the generalized sign restriction identification approach
described in Amir Ahmadi and Uhlig [2008]. Section (6) analyzes the policy re-
action to identified aggregate supply and demand shocks. Section (7) looks at
possible effects of systematic monetary policy, examining conditional forecasts
of key time series with and without the policy instrument at critical junctures.
Section (8) concludes.
2 The Model
The key idea behind dynamic factor models is to provide a parsimonious rep-
resentation of the comovements in a large set of cross-sectional data by only a
limited number of unobserved latent factors. The dynamic factor model (hence-
forth DFM) allows dynamics in both the common component - represented by
these factors and their respective factor loadings - and the variable-specific id-
iosyncratic component. The factor-augmented vector autoregression (henceforth
FAVAR) model is a hybrid between a DFM and the standard structural VAR
model: a joint VAR is specified for some series of interest f yt and some factors
f ct that are extracted from a large panel of informational time series X
c
t . The
working hypothesis of the FAVAR model is that while a narrow set of variables
f yt , notably the policy instrument of the central bank, are perfectly observable
and have pervasive effects on the economy, the underlying dynamics of the econ-
omy are less perfectly observable, and hence a VAR in just a few key variables
would potentially suffer from omitted variable bias. As increasing the size of
a VAR is impractical due to problems of dimensionality, the FAVAR approach
aims to extract the common dynamics from a wide set of informational indica-
tor series Xct , and to include these in the VAR, represented by a small number of
factors f ct . This approach is well suited for structural analysis such as impulse
response analysis and variance decomposition (in particular for the problem at
hand). For the estimation procedure the model has to be cast in a state-space
representation. The informational variables Xct included in the observation equa-
tion are assumed to be driven by observable variables with pervasive effects on
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the economy (e.g. the central bank’s policy instrument), f yt , a small number of
unobservable common factors, f ct , which together represent the main ”driving
forces” of the economy, and an idiosyncratic component ect , i.e.
Xct = λ
c f ct + λ
y f yt + e
c
t (2.1)
ect ∼ N(0, Re) (2.2)
Here λ f and λy denote the matrix of factor loadings of the factors and the policy
instrument, with dimension [Nc × Kc] and [Nc × Ny], respectively. The error
term ect has mean 0 and a variance/covariance matrix R, which is assumed to
be diagonal. Hence the error terms of the observable variables are mutually
uncorrelated.
The FAVAR state equation represents the joint dynamics of factors and the
observable policy variables ( f ct , f
y
t ). f ct
f yt
 = b(L)
 f ct−1
f yt−1
+ Aν ft (2.3)
u ft = Aν
f
t (2.4)
u ft ∼ N(0, Qu) (2.5)
where u ft is the time t reduced form shock and ν
f
t the time t structural shock,
with the contemporaneous relations represented through matrix A. The dimen-
sions are [K × 1], [K × 1] and [K × K] respectively, where K = Kc + Ny denotes
the total number of factors including the perfectly observables ones. In the sub-
sequent estimation we consider the following finite order VAR(P) approximation
of the unobserved state dynamics f ct
f yt
 = P∑
p=1
bp
 f ct−1
f yt−1
+ Aν ft . (2.6)
2.1 Factor Identification
Identification of the model against rotational indeterminacy requires normaliza-
tion and additional restrictions. We follow the approach of Bernanke, Boivin
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and Eliasz [2005] and normalize the upper [Kc × Kc] block of λ f to the identity
matrix and restrict the upper [Kc × Ny] block of λy to only contain zeros.1
3 Estimation and Identification of Shocks
3.1 Estimation
We cast the state space model of the previous section into a stacked first order
Markov state space representation. Estimation is implemented by a multi-move
Gibbs sampler, which involves the Kalman smoother for evaluating the likeli-
hood of the unobserved factors. Given the sequence of sampled factors we draw
the parameters via posterior sampling. In particular we employ a Gibbs sampler
for the two blocks of parameters, the first referring to the parameters of the ob-
servation equation and the second block containing the parameter space of the
state equation. The above state space representation can be rewritten as
Xt = λ ft + et (3.1)
ft =
P
∑
p=1
bp ft−p + u
f
t (3.2)
where
λ =
 λ f λy
0Ny×Kc INy
 , R =
 Re 0
0 0
 (3.3)
where Xt = (Xct
′, f yt
′)
′
, e′t = (ect
′, 0)′ and ft = ( f ct
′, f yt
′)
′
. For the companion
form of the model we define Ft = ( ft′, ft−1′, ..., ft−p+1′)
′, ut = (u
f
t
′
, 0, ..., 0)
′
, b =
1Note that this approach is overidentified. However, it is easy to implement and does not
require further sign restrictions on the factor loadings or further normalizations of the covariance
matrices of the residuals. Alternative restrictions and normalizations for factor identification
are reported e.g. in Geweke and Zhou [1996]. The analysis and comparison of the different
approaches to factor identification goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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(b1, b2, . . . , bP) and
B =

b1 b2 . . . bp−1 bP
IK 0 . . . 0 0
0 IK . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . IK 0

, Q =

Qu 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 0
 .
where the 0’s and Q have dimension [K × K] , and [PK × PK] respectively. We
define Λ ≡ [λ 0 . . . 0]. The final companion form results in
Ft = BFt−1 + ut (3.4)
Xt = ΛFt + et (3.5)
The parameter space to be estimated is given by θ = (λy,λ f , b, Re, Qu), while
the history of the observed data and the latent factors are given by XT =
(X1, . . . , XT) and FT = (F1, . . . , FT) respectively. Hence the estimation algorithm
can be simplified and summarized by two steps relying on the blocking scheme.
First we initialize the sampler by finding starting values θ0 =
(λ f 0,λy0, b0, R0e , Q0u) and (F0). Given a set of initial values (θ0, F0) we sample
the parameters conditional on the data, and afterwards sample the latent factors
given the new set of parameters and data.
Step 1: FT(g) = p(FT | XT, θ(g−1))
Step 2: θ(g) = p(θ | XT, FT(g))
We cycle through this procedure sufficiently many times until the target dis-
tribution has been empirically approximated. An initial number of draws will
be discarded as burn in. To reduce the dependency of the posterior sampler
and to reduce the autocorrelation of the chain, a thinning parameter κ ≥ 1 is
introduced. Hence only every κth draw after the burn in is stored. Details about
the implementation and specification are reported in section (4) on the empirical
application. Algorithm (1) contains a pseudo code of the employed algorithm
for illustrative purposes. A detailed technical derivation and description of the
posterior sampling technique is provided in Appendix (A).
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Algorithm 1 FAVAR estimation via Multi-move Gibbs sampling
Step 0, [Initialization]: p0(F0,λ f 0,λy0, b0, R0e , Q0u).
Set g ; 0.
Get initial values for states and parameters.
Set g ; 1.
Step 1, [Evaluate likelihood of latent states]: p(FT | XT,λ, Re, b, Qu) ∼ FFBS
Do forward filtering and backward sampling
Step 2, [Sample parameters from observation equation]: p(λn, Re,nn | XT, FT)
2.a : p(Re,nn | λ(g−1)n , XT, FT) ∼ fIG
2.b : p(λn | R(g)e,nn, XT, FT) ∼ fN
Sample equation by equation due to conditional Gaussianity.
Step 3, [Sample parameters from state equation]: p(b, Qu | XT, FT)
3.a : p(Qu | FT(g), XT) ∼ fIW
3.b : p(b | Q(g)u , FT(g), XT) ∼ fN
Sample parameters from a normal inverted Wishart density.
If g ≤ G set g ; g + 1 and go to Step 1. Otherwise stop.
3.2 Identification of Shocks
One objective of this paper is to analyze the role of monetary policy shocks dur-
ing the US Great Depression. This involves identifying the non-systematic part
of monetary policy. The traditional approach in our model framework would
be the Cholesky identification, where the policy instrument is ordered last in
the FAVAR equation. Then, the policy instrument reacts contemporaneously to
the other variables through the common factors but not vice versa. As shown
in Amir Ahmadi and Uhlig [2008] this approach is flawed and produces unrea-
sonable results for post-war US data.2. In this paper we therefore follow the
methodology of Amir Ahmadi and Uhlig [2008]. Generalizing results of Uh-
lig [2005] to the dynamic factor model, this approach identifies policy through
restrictions on the sign of the impulse response functions for specified periods.3
Identification of structural shocks through imposing sign restrictions is based
on assumptions about the sign of the impulse response functions of key macroe-
conomic variables. Such restrictions should represent ‘conventional wisdom’ de-
2We also experimented with the traditional Cholesky decomposition, and encountered similar
problems on an even larger scale.
3Implementations of sign restrictions in similar models can also be found e.g. in Mo¨nch
[2005] and Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha [2007].
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rived from economic theory that most researchers can agree on.4 Sign restric-
tions turn out to be particularly well suited to the FAVAR model, as they are
straightforward to impose on a large number of series.
The structural FAVAR is obtained by inserting (2.4) into the reduced form
version in (3.2):
ft =
P
∑
p=1
bp ft−p + Aν
f
t
The crucial step is to represent the one-step ahead prediction error ν ft as a lin-
ear combination of suitably defined orthogonalized structural shocks (see Uhlig
[2005]. For this, assume the fundamental innovations are mutually independent
and have unit variance,
E[ν ft ν
f
t
′
] = IK
The restriction on A then emerges from the covariance structure of the re-
duced form factor innovation, which leads to:
Qu = E[u
f
t u
f
t
′
]
E[u ft u
f
t
′
] = AE[ν ft ν
f
t
′
]A′
AE[ν ft ν
f
t
′
]A′ = AA′
Following Uhlig [2005] we define an impulse vector as a column of matrix A.
Such a vector can be obtained from any decomposition, e.g. the Cholesky de-
composition, of the VCV matrix of the factor residual matrix A˜A˜′ = Qu.
Definition 1 The vector a ∈ <K is called an impulse vector, iff there is some matrix
A, so that AA′ = Qu and so that a is a column of A
According to Proposition 1 of Uhlig [2005,pp. 18], any impulse vector can be
characterized as follows. Let A˜A˜′ = Qu be the Cholesky decomposition. Then a
is an impulse vector if and only if there is some K-dimensional vector α of unit
length so that
a = A˜α
4The sign restriction approach was introduced to the SVAR literature by Dywer [1997], Faust
[1998], Canova and de Nicolo [2002], and Uhlig [2005].
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Given the impulse vector, let rk(s) ∈ <K be the vector response at horizon s to
the k-th shock in a Cholesky decomposition of Qu. Then the impulse response
ra(s) for a is simply given by
ra(s) =
K
∑
i=1
αiri(s).
For estimation consider the companion form of the state space in (3.4)-(3.5)
Ft = BFt−1 + ut
Xt = ΛFt + et
To compute the impulse response vector a, let a = [a′, 01,K(P−1)]′ and compute
ra,k(s) = (Bsa)k.
to get the impulse response of factor k to an impulse in a at horizon s. Note
that ra(s) is the vector of impulse response functions of all factors to an impulse
vector a at horizon s. As a second step we have to compute the impulse response
functions of the single variables by combining the respective factor loading with
ra(s) accordingly. This requires us to compute
rna (s) = Λnra(s).
where Λn is the respective n-th row vector of the factor loading matrix. We set
the sign restriction on the shape of the individual impulse response functions
according to the following assumption, following Uhlig [2005]: Assumption 1
A (contractionary) monetary policy impulse vector is an impulse vector a so that
the individual impulse response functions to a of price and nonborrowed reserves are
not positive and the impulse responses for the policy instrument such as the short term
discount rate (controllable monetary aggregate, e.g. M1) is not negative (positive), for a
specified horizon s=0,. . . ,S.
Table (1) provides a summary of the identifying sign restrictions we impose.
4 Specification and Model Fit
4.1 Data and Model Specification
All data are taken from the NBER’s macroeconomic history database. Most of
these data are contemporary and were collected for the business cycle dating
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Table 1: Sign restrictions imposed for identification
amoney asupply ademand
CPI Inflation ≤ 0 0 ≥ ≤ 0
General Price Index ≤ 0 0 ≥ ≤ 0
Whole Sale Price Index Metal ≤ 0
FRB Production Index ≤ 0 ≤ 0
Discount Rate 0 ≥
Commercial Paper Rate 0 ≥
M0 ≤ 0
This table summarizes the restrictions imposed for the contemporaneous period and the specified
number of periods following the shock. Each column defines an impulse vector to one orthogonal
shock. The shocks are: amoney : deflationary monetary policy shock, ademand negative demand
shock, asupply positive supply shock.
project of Burns and Mitchell [1947]. Our dataset includes a total of 164 time
series, ranging from industrial production to order flows and housing startups,
agricultural, raw material, and finished goods prices, measures of deposits, sav-
ings, and liquidity in the banking system, as well as interest rates on call money,
commercial paper, and various medium and long term bonds. Table 2 in Ap-
pendix B provides the details along with the NBER macroeconomic database
classification codes. To achieve stationarity, some of the data series were trans-
formed into logarithmic first differences.
We estimate the model using the data in monthly frequency for the US from
1919:02 until 1939:02. This period covers the slide into and recovery from the
recession of 1920-21, as well as the downturn of the Great Depression. In the
following, we report the results from a FAVAR model with Kc = 4 factors and
P = 12 lags5 on a dataset including one policy instrument and N = 164 informa-
tional variables.6.
5We tried several versions with different lag length (up to 13), without much change in the
results.
6We experimented with including more factors, and found that little information was added
by increasing the dimension of the system. This is broadly consistent with the results in Stock
and Watson [2005], who report an optimal choice of seven factors for their postwar U.S. data set
of 132 series with this methodology.
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4.2 Model Fit
We performed several checks to see whether the model represents the data in
an adequate manner. The first obvious check is to obtain the goodness of fit
of the observation equation (2.1) for each series Xc. Results are listed in Table
(3) below. As can be seen, the overall fit is high; the factors seem to capture
the common components of the interwar business cycle well. Thus, a VAR in
these factors or common components should not suffer from omitted variable
bias. This implies that adding individual series to the VAR in eq. (2.3) above
will not alter the shape of any impulse response functions substantially.7 Upon
increasing the number of factors, the model fit did not change much, and the
subsequent VAR analysis remained basically unaffected.
4.3 Convergence Diagnostics
To ensure that the results are based on converged simulation chains that rep-
resent the respective target distribution and not only e.g. some local mode, we
applied a battery of further convergence diagnostics to the simulated parameters.
The respective diagnostics are not a guarantee for convergence but can reduce
the uncertainty. The diagnostics we employed are widespread in the MCMC
literature, and are reported in Appendix D. We also checked the precision of the
sampler by plotting the associated error bands. An example for the extracted
factors covering the 95 % probability band is given in Figure (1).
5 The Surprise Component of Monetary Policy
We follow standard procedure in VAR analysis and obtain impulse responses
to identified monetary policy shocks, employing the FAVAR model as a repre-
sentation of the monetary transmission mechanism. As mentioned above, our
attempts to obtain economically meaningful impulse responses from a Cholesky
decomposition of the FAVAR model failed. 8 Hence we resort to Uhlig’s [2005]
sign restriction strategy. We implement this by imposing, among others, a sign
7If this property holds strictly, the factor model is termed exact. If including individual
series adds to the information content significantly but with small coefficients, the factor model
is approximate. See Stock and Watson [2005] for a survey of the implications and for testing
strategies.
8Results are available upon request.
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restriction on the response of the CPI to a contractionary monetary shock9.
There has been some uncertainty as to which monetary policy instrument
was actually used at the time. The discussions in Friedman and Schwartz [1963]
suggest a role for targeting monetary aggregates, but also leave a role for interest
rates. We therefore present results for five model specifications, each correspond-
ing to a different candidate policy instrument. These include two interest rates –
the Federal Discount Rate and the rate on prime commercial paper – and three
monetary aggregates – high powered money M0 as well as M1 and M2.
In spite of the restrictions we impose, the results are not encouraging. The
responses of the FRB index of manufacturing to a contractionary interest rate
shock in the Discount Rate model follow a rotated S-shaped pattern, being near-
significantly negative both at the one year and after the three year lag, and
weakly positive in between (see Figure 4 below). The contribution of a con-
tractionary discount rate policy shock to the forecast error variance of industrial
production remains below 10% over four years (see Table 4 for a tabulation of all
variance decompositions reported here). Choosing the Commercial Paper Rate
as the relevant policy instrument instead, the impulse response function remains
in negative territory throughout (see Figure 5). However, the values are insignif-
icant, and the contribution of the policy shock to the forecast error variance of
FRB manufacturing remains solidly below 10%. This is pretty much what Uhlig
[2005] found for U.S. postwar data.
Model specifications with monetary aggregates as the policy instrument fare
slightly better. Responses to a shock in high-powered money M0 as the policy
instrument are again S-shaped, veering from negative into positive and back
into negative (Figure 6). The same S-shaped pattern is obtained for responses to
shocks in M2, except that the response in the second year goes to zero instead
of into positive (Figure 8). Responses to shocks in M1 look well behaved for the
first year but then rapidly lose force (Figure 7). The variance decompositions
show that responses to M0 and M1 shocks contributed between 15 and 20% to
the forecast error variance of FRB manufacturing output. For M2 as the policy
instrument, the explained variance of FRB manufacturing remains well below
10%, averaging between 6 and 7% over the four-year horizon that we look at.
9A detailed list of sign restrictions imposed for identification can be found in Table (1)
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This seems close to the values reported by BBE [2005] for postwar industrial
output.10
Drawing the results of this section together, we find that the responses of
the real economy to contractionary monetary shocks are in generally weak and,
pathologically, change their signs. This result obtains under four of five different
specifications of the monetary policy instrument and two different identification
schemes for the innovations in the VAR. Still the best results we obtain for re-
sponses to shocks in M1, which do not exhibit sign changes and which explain
around 20% of the forecast error variance of manufacturing output. This is in
line with postwar data. A FAVAR model drawing on rich data from the interwar
period does not find evidence for unusual, pervasive negative effects of contrac-
tionary monetary policy during the Great Depression.
6 The Systematic Component of Monetary Policy
6.1 The Policy Reaction Function
Our analysis so far has been agnostic about the choice of monetary policy in-
struments, and has worked with several candidate policy instruments instead.
This section attempts to identify the reaction function of monetary policy dur-
ing the Great Depression. To this end, we obtain the responses of the respective
candidate monetary policy instrument to aggregate demand and supply shocks,
using the same techniques as before. In this way, we can directly measure if and
how the monetary authority reacted to change in output and prices.
6.2 Aggregate Supply Shocks
6.2.1 Full Sample Analysis
As laid out before, we again employ a sign restrictions approach to identify
supply and demand shocks. We identify a positive aggregate supply shock by
restricting the response of CPI inflation to be negative and the response of the
FRB index of manufacturing to be positive for a horizon of 6 months. Results
indicate only weak systematic responses. For the observation period as a whole,
the instruments in the Commercial Paper Rate model (Figure 9) and the Federal
10A full set of impulse response functions for all series of the dataset is available from the
authors upon request.
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Discount Rate model (Figure 10) exhibit moves in the wrong direction, with no
visible effect on high powered money M0 or on M1. In the Federal Discount
Rate model, M2 would even increase significantly, indicating monetary accom-
modation of the positive supply shock.
The monetary targeting models fare somewhat better: with M0 or M1 as
the monetary instrument (in Figures 11 and 12, respectively) there is a clear-cut
negative response of M2 to the positive supply shock. However, there is no clear
response of the respective candidate monetary instruments themselves, casting
doubt on the underlying money multiplier mechanism. Assuming instead that
M2 itself is the monetary instrument (in Figure 13), we do obtain strong interest
rate responses, however the response of M2 itself veers into positive after just a
few months.
On the basis of these results, it would seem safe to exclude inflation target-
ing through interest rates from the list of possible policy functions of the Federal
Reserve. The better performance of the monetary specifications provides some
support for the Friedman and Schwartz [1963] monetary targeting view. How-
ever, the connection between M0 or M1 and the monetary M2 target seems less
than clear-cut, and the responses of M2 are plagued by sign problems. Looking
at the observation period as a whole, the evidence for systematic responses of
monetary policy seems rather mixed.
6.2.2 Subsample Analysis
Turning to the analysis of subsample periods we find that a somewhat different
picture emerges. The subsamples are five critical junctures during the observa-
tion period. The first includes the information in the FAVAR as of September
1929, the last month before the New York stock market crash. The second in-
cludes all data until November 1930, the last month before the first wave of
banking panics. The third extends to June 1931, just before the German debt
and reparations moratorium, which triggered Britain’s departure from the gold
Standard. The fourth extends to August 1931, the last month before Britain in-
deed broke away from the Gold Standard. The last is based on information up
until February 1933, the month before Roosevelt’s bank closure and the formal
inception of the New Deal. For the Federal Discount Rate model, we find an
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increase in short term interest rates in response to a positive supply shock for
up to 2 years. Turning to the three monetary aggregate models, there is now a
clear-cut response of the short term interest rates for all subperiods except for
the first one.
The results from the subsample analysis suggests that systematic monetary
policy did respond increasingly to supply shocks. The responses of the policy
instruments were feeble until 1929 but became more pronounced as time pro-
gressed and the slump deepened. Still, the responses we observe are not free of
sign problems, indicating that the identifying restrictions may still not be strong
enough. Results for all subperiods are provided in Appendix E, available upon
request from the authors.
6.3 Aggregate Demand Shocks
6.3.1 Full Sample Analysis
As outlined above, we identify a negative demand shock through imposing a
negative response of both FRB manufacturing output and CPI inflation for 6
months. For the full observation period, the response of the policy instruments
to a negative aggregate demand shock is insignificant. Assuming an interest rate
to be the policy instrument, short term interest rates slightly decrease following
a negative demand shock. However, this holds only with a high degree of un-
certainty. The specifications with monetary aggregates as instruments perform
poorly, indicating no monetary response at all or even a slight degree of accom-
modation, as in the case of the M1 model. Results are reported in Appendix D
in Figures 14 through 18.
6.3.2 Subsample Analysis
Turning to the subsample analysis, we find that the response of interest rates to
an adverse demand shock became more pronounced over time. This result holds
for all five models considered. Again, there are sign problems in the responses
of the monetary aggregates. Results for the subsample periods, provided in
Appendix E, can be requested from the authors.
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7 Any Effects of Systematic Monetary Policy?
This section ventures into monetary policy effects that might go beyond mere
on-off surprises. Under rational expectations and a minimal set of frictions, as is
standard in the surprise Phillips curve paradigm since Lucas [1972], systematic
monetary policy along a reaction function should be neutral and have no real
effects. Any monetary policy effects beyond one-time surprises would entail
deviations from rational expectations, or possibly a tighter set of constraints
on the pricing mechanism. Such deviations, e.g. Friedman’s [1968] backward-
looking adaptive expectations approach, appear to come closest in spirit to the
original Friedman and Schwartz [1963] hypothesis.
In a reduced form model like the FAVAR we specified, estimates of the model
parameters θ = (λy,λ f , b, Re, Qu) are obtained conditional on the prevailing
monetary policy regime { f m}t0, where m is the monetary policy instrument. This
would render policy evaluation through counterfactual variations of the policy
sequence meaningless, Lucas [1976]. The only permissible statement is there-
fore about the information content of the observed policy sequence, conditional
on the agents’ information set at time t. Under rational expectations, only the
innovations to policy matter. Hence, historical realizations of the monetary pol-
icy instrument should not influence agents’ expectations about the state of the
economy f yt+s, i.e.
E( f yt+s|It, f mt0) = E( f yt+s|It) (7.1)
In principle, both sides of this equation can be evaluated separately, and
their empirical forecasting power be compared. This is the estimation strategy
adopted in this section. By standard arguments about reverse causality, higher
forecasting precision of the LHS of this equation (i.e, when monetary policy his-
tory { f m}t0 is included) is not sufficient for the presence of systematic policy
effects. Rational expectations imply, however, that it is a necessary condition: if
upon including past realizations of the monetary policy instrument, no improve-
ment in forecasting power is found, it seems safe to rule out systematic policy
effects, as predicted by the rational expectations approach.
In what follows we present forecasts of a few key series conditional on infor-
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mation at time t for five critical junctures during the Great Depression. The first
includes the information set as of September 1929, the last month before the New
York stock market crash. The second includes the data until November 1930, the
last month before the first wave of banking panics. The third extends to June
1931, just before the Austrian/German financial crisis. The fourth extends to Au-
gust 1931, the last month before Britain broke away from the Gold Standard. The
last forecast is based on information up until February 1933, the month before
Roosevelt’s bank closure and the formal inception of the New Deal. For each
of these observation subperiods, we obtain a baseline conditional forecast from
the FAVAR model excluding all of the candidate monetary policy instruments.
For the same subperiods, we also obtain five more conditional forecasts from the
FAVAR, each including one of the five candidate monetary policy instruments.
The forecast error variance from these predictions can then be compared to the
baseline.
Figure 19 shows the results from the baseline forecasts. As can be seen from
the forecasts of both FRB manufacturing output and orders of machinery (a
leading indicator of equipment investment), neither the onset of the recession
nor its further deepening are very well captured by this non-monetary base-
line. The baseline from late 1929 does predict a major deflationary episode, but
the forecasts taken at later times all wrongly predict an inflationary correction.
These non-monetary FAVARs appear to bear out conventional wisdom about
the early phase of the slump, as laid out in Friedman and Schwartz [1963] and
Bernanke [1983], or in Temin [1989]: the sharp downturn after 1929 was itself not
predictable. They also broadly confirm work of Dominguez, Fair, and Shapiro
[1988] who found the depression difficult to predict from non-monetary VARs.
Figures 20 and 21 provide forecasts including the commercial paper rate and
the discount rate as policy instruments, respectively. The first group of forecasts
underpredicts output at very short intervals, generating scenarios of sharp down-
ward spikes and swift recoveries. The forecasts from the discount rate model, in
contrast, overpredict output at short intervals. Both group of forecasts broadly
agree on predicting inflation.
Figures 22 and 23 suggest that FAVARs including M0 or M1 are somewhat bet-
ter at predicting output at short intervals than the interest rate models; they also
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appear to perform better than the non-monetary baseline. This does not hold
true for the M2 model, which does not perform better than the non-monetary
baseline. Again, all forecasts agree on predicting imminent inflation at most of
the critical junctures of the Great Depression. A central bank employing any of
these forecasts would not have regarded its stance during the Great Depression
as deflationary.
Examination of the root mean square forecast errors in Tables 5 to 8 confirms
this impression. At all horizons, forecasts of output from the M0 and M1 model
outperform the non-monetary baseline. This does not hold for the interest rate
specifications as well as the M2 model. Unsurprisingly, inclusion of any of the
five candidate policy instruments in the FAVAR outperforms the baseline in pre-
dicting CPI inflation. Still, it is remarkable that none of the FAVARs predict the
protracted deflationary process witnessed in the Great Depression.
This evidence is again consistent with conventional wisdom, see in particular
Hamilton [1987, 1992]. There appears to be no evidence of learning or updating
about the deflationary process; the priors in the forecast of CPI appear impos-
sible to overturn. Taking this further, if the FAVAR aggregates the information
available to monetary decision makers at the time, their lack of worries about
easing monetary policy becomes apparent: given the strongly inflationary sig-
nals that monetary policy appeared to be emitting, no further action seemed
necessary or even useful. Monetary policy in the conventional sense had lost
traction in 1929, and apparently die not regain it before well into the 1930s.
Drawing the evidence from this section together, there is some evidence that
past realizations of monetary policy help to improve output forecasts during the
depression. This is particularly true for M0 and M1 as candidate policy instru-
ments, which beat the non-monetary baseline forecasts. Systematic monetary
policy was perhaps more informative about the state of the U.S. economy dur-
ing the depression than would be compatible with rational expectations. How-
ever, even the forecasts including past realizations of monetary policy are far
from satisfactory: monetary policy regimes do not appear to explain the Great
Depression.
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8 Conclusion
Recent research has attempted to increase the explanatory power of vector au-
toregressions for monetary policy analysis by drawing on the common compo-
nents in a large panel of time series. In this paper, we employed the factor
augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) methodology of Bernanke, Boivin
and Eliasz [2005] to reassess the effects of monetary policy on the U.S. economy
during the interwar Great Depression.
We used a panel of 164 time series, taken from the macroeconomic history
database of the NBER, to provide information on the common component of
the U.S. business cycle during the interwar period. We specified FAVARs based
on this information set for five different specifications of the monetary policy
instrument.
To avoid pervasive price puzzles, we were forced to employ a sign restrictions
approach. In spite of the identifying assumptions we make, we find that while
monetary policy was clearly not neutral, its effects on the real economy were
mixed and changed signs. Also, we find the overall contribution of monetary
policy to the variance explanation of real variables to be as low as in the postwar
period, if not lower.
We obtained the responses of the various candidate policy instruments to
identified demand and supply shocks in order to identify the reaction function
of monetary policy. In general we found these responses to be weak; however
there is evidence of an increased responsiveness to both real and nominal shocks
as the depression deepened. We also tested for deviations from the rational
expectations paradigm in order to see if systematic policy effects were present.
While there is some evidence of such effects, they are again far from clear-cut
and pervasive.
At the present stage, we conclude that while monetary policy certainly
played some role in the interwar depression, there is only scant support for
the traditional hypothesis that the Great Depression was mostly a monetary phe-
nomenon.
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Appendix
A Bayesian Inference based on MCMC
A.1 Inference
Bayesian analysis treats the parameters of the model as random variables. We
are interested in inference on the parameter space Θ =
(
Λ f ,Λy, R, vec(Φ),Σν
)
and the factors {Ft}Tt=1. Multi move Gibbs Sampling alternately samples the pa-
rameters θ and the factors Ft, given the data. We use the multi move version of
the Gibbs sampler because this approach allows us as, a first step, to estimate the
unobserved common components, namely the factors via the Kalman filtering
technique conditional on the given hyperparameters, and as a second step calcu-
late the hyperparameters of the model given the factors via the Gibbs sampler
in the respective blocking.
Let X˜T = (X1, . . . , XT) and F˜T = (F1, . . . , FT) define the histories of X and
F, respectively. The task is to derive the posterior densities which require to
empirically approximate the marginal posterior densities of F and Θ:
p(F˜T) =
∫
p(F˜T, θ)dΘ
p(Θ) =
∫
p(F˜T,Θ)dF˜T
where
p(F˜T,Θ)
is the joint posterior density and the integrals are taken with respect to the
supports of Θ and FT respectively. The procedure applied to obtain the empirical
approximation of the posterior distribution is the previously mentioned multi
move version of the Gibbs sampling technique by Carter and Kohn [1994] which
is also applied by BBE11.
A.2 Choosing the Starting Values Θ0
In general one can start the iteration cycle with any arbitrary randomly drawn
set of parameters, as the joint and marginal empirical distributions of the gen-
erated parameters will converge at an exponential rate to its joint and marginal
11For more details see Kim and Nelson [1999], Eliasz [2005] and BBE [2005]
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target distributions as S → ∞. This has been shown by Geman and Geman
[1984]. We will try several starting values in order to assure that our model
has converged and does not depend on the choice of initial values. We follow
the advice of Eliasz [2005] that one should judiciously select the starting values
in the framework of large dimensional models. In case of large cross-sections,
highly dimensional likelihoods make irregularities more likely. This can reduce
the number of draws relevant for convergence and hence saves time, which in
a computer-intensive statistical framework is of great relevance. We apply the
first step estimates of principal component analysis to select the starting values.
Since Gelman and Rubin [1992] have shown that a single chain of the Gibbs sam-
pler might give a ”false sense of security ”, it has become common practice to
try out different starting values, at best from a randomly (over)dispersed set of
parameters, and then check the convergence verifying that they lead to similar
empirical distributions.
A.3 Conditional density of the factors {Ft}Tt=1 given X˜T and Θ
In this subsection we want to draw from
p(F˜T | X˜T,Θ)
assuming that the hyperparameters of the parameter space Θ are given, hence
we describe Bayesian inference on the dynamic evolution of the factors Ft condi-
tional on Xt for t = 1, . . . , T and conditional on Θ. The transformations that are
required to draw the factors have been done in the previous section. The con-
ditional distribution, from which the state vector is generated, can be expressed
as the product of conditional distributions by exploiting the Markov property of
state space models in the following way
p(F˜T | X˜T,Θ) = p(FT | X˜T,Θ)
T−1
∏
t=1
pF(Ft | Ft+1, X˜T,Θ)
The state space model is linear and Gaussian, hence we have:
FT | X˜T,Θ ∼ N(FT|T, PT|T) (A.1)
Ft | Ft+1XT,Θ ∼ N(Ft|t,Ft+1 , Pt|t,Ft+1) (A.2)
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with
FT|T = E(FT | X˜T,Θ) (A.3)
PT|T = Cov(FT | X˜T,Θ) (A.4)
Ft|t,Ft+1 = E(Ft | X˜T, Ft+1,Θ) = E(Ft | Ft+1, Ft|t,Θ) (A.5)
Pt|t,Ft+1 = Cov(Ft | X˜T, Ft+1,Θ) = Cov(Ft | Ft+1, Ft|t,Θ) (A.6)
where (A.1) holds for the Kalman filter for t = 1, . . . , T and (A.2) holds for the
Kalman smoother for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1. Here Ft|t refers to the expectation
of Ft conditional on information dated t or earlier. We can, then, obtain Ft|t
and Pt|t for t = 1, . . . , T by the Kalman Filter, conditional on Θ and the data
X˜T, by applying the formulas in Hamilton (1994), for example. From the last
iteration, we obtain FT|T and PT|T and using those, we can draw Ft. We can go
backwards through the sample, deriving FT−1|T−1,Ft and PT−1|T−1,Ft by Kalman
Filter, drawing FT−1 from (14), and so on for Ft, t = T − 2, T − 3, . . . , 1. A
modification of the Kalman filter procedure, as described in Kim and Nelson
(1999), is necessary when the number of lags p in the FAVAR equation is greater
than 1.
A.4 B.1.3 Conditional density of the parameters Θ given X˜T and
{Ft}Tt=1
Drawing from the conditional distribution of the parameters p(Θ | X˜T, F˜T) can
be blocked into to parts, namely the one referring to the observation equation
and the second part referring to the state equation.
A.4.1 Conditional density of Λ and R
This part refers to observation equation of the state space model which, condi-
tional on the estimated factors and the data, specifies the distribution of Λ and
R. Here we can apply equation by equation OLS in order to obtain Λˆ and Zˆ.
This is feasible due to the fact that the errors are uncorrelated. According to
the specification by BBE we also assume a proper (conjugate) but diffuse inverse
Gamma prior for each σ2n:
Rpriorii ∼ IG(3, 0.001)
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Note that R is assumed to be diagonal. The posterior then has the following
form
Rposteriorii | XT, FT ∼ IG(R¯ii, T + 0.001)
where R¯ii = 3 + Zˆ′i Zˆi + Λˆ
′
i[M
−1
0 + (F
(i)
T
′
F(i)T )
−1]−1Λˆi and M−10 denoting the vari-
ance parameter in the prior on the coefficients of the i-th equation of Λi. The
normalization discussed in section (4) in order to identify the factors and the
loadings separately requires to set M0 = I. Conditional on the drawn value of
Rii the prior on the factor loadings of the i-th equation is:
Λpriori ∼ N (0, Rii M−10 ).
The regressors of the i-th equation are represented by F˜(i)T . The values of Λi are
drawn from the posterior
Λposteriori ∼ N (Λ¯i, Rii M¯−1i )
where Λ¯i = M¯−1i (F
(i)
T
′
FiT)Λˆi and M¯
−1
i (F
(i)
T
′
FiT).
A.4.2 B.1.3.2 Conditional density of vec(Φ) and Σν
The next Gibbs block requires to draw vec(Φ) and Σν conditional on the most
current draws of the factors, the R′iis and Λ
′
is and the data. As the FAVAR
equation has a standard VAR form one can likewise estimate vec(Φˆ) and Σˆν via
equation by equation OLS. We impose a diffuse conjugate Normal-Wishart prior:
vec(Φ)prior | Σν ∼ N (0,Σν ⊗Ω0)
Σpriorν ∼ IW(Σν,0, K + M + 2)
which results in the following posterior:
vec(Φ)posterior ∼ N (vec(Φ¯),Σν ⊗ Ω¯)
Σposteriorν ∼ IW(Σ¯ν, T + K + M + 2)
In the spirit of the Minnesota prior, it is desirable to have a prior which as-
signs less impact to more distant lags. Hence, the BBE [2005] specification fol-
lows Kadiyala and Karlsson [1997]. First we draw Σν from the posterior, where
Σ¯ν = Σν,0 + Vˆ′Vˆ + Φˆ′[Ω0 + (F′T−1FT−1)
−1]−1Φˆ and where Vˆ is the matrix of OLS
29
residuals. Then, conditional on the draw Σν we draw from the posterior of the
coefficients where Φ¯ = Ω¯(F′T−1FT−1)Φˆ and Ω¯ = (Ω
−1
0 + (F
′
T−1FT−1))
−1. To en-
sure stationarity, we truncate the draws and only accept values for Φ less than
one in absolute values . This block on Kalman filter and smoother and the block
on drawing the parameter space are iterated until convergence is achieved. For
the implementation of the DCNW prior it required to set the diagonal elements
of Σν,0 to the corresponding d-lag univariate autoregressions, σ2i . We construct
the diagonal elements of Ω0 such that the prior variances of the parameter of
the k lagged j’th variable in the i’th equation equals σ2i /kσ
2
j .
12
12For a detailed discussion of the implementation of the prior see the NBER working paper
version of BBE (2004) and Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997).
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B Data
All data are taken from the NBER’s macroeconomic history database. Most of
these data are contemporary and were collected for the business cycle dating
project of Burns and Mitchell (1947). Our dataset includes a total of 164 time
series.
Pos.
NBER
Code
Description TC SA
1 1130 PIG IRON PRODUCTION 5 0
2 4051 INDEX OF THE GENERAL PRICE LEVEL 5 0
3 13012 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK DISCOUNT RATES, SAN FRANCISCO 1 0
4 14125 CURRENCY HELD BY THE PUBLIC 5 1
5 1054 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF MANUFACTURES, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 5 1
6 1055 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF PRODUCERS GOODS 5 1
7 1056 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF CONSUMERS GOOD 5 1
8 1057 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF CONSUMERS GOODS, EXCLUDING AUTOMO-
BILES
5 1
9 01057A INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF DURABLE GOODS 5 1
10 01057B INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF TRANSIENT GOODS 5 1
11 1058 WHEAT FLOUR PRODUCTION 5 0
12 1060 CORN GRINDINGS 5 0
13 1064 TOTAL MEAT CONSUMPTION 5 0
14 1071 BUTTER CONSUMPTION 5 0
15 1105 PAPER PRODUCTION, ALL GRADES 5 0
16 01125A CRUDE PETROLEUM CONSUMPTION, RUNS TO STILLS 5 0
17 1126 GASOLINE PRODUCTION AT REFINERIES 5 0
18 1131 MERCHANT PIG IRON PRODUCTION 5 1
19 1135 STEEL INGOT PRODUCTION 5 0
20 1144 AUTOMOBILE PRODUCTION, TRUCKS 5 0
21 1148 RAILROAD LOCOMOTIVE SHIPMENTS, DOMESTIC, BY CAR BUILDERS 5 0
22 1149 FREIGHT CAR SHIPMENTS, DOMESTIC 5 0
23 1171 WOODWORKING MACHINERY SHIPMENTS, VALUE 5 0
24 1175 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF MANUFACTURES, TOTAL 5 0
25 01191B INDEX OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION OF FOODSTUFFS AND TOBACCO 5 1
26 1204 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF FUELS 5 1
27 1234 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF DURABLE MANUFACTURES 5 1
28 1260 INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF MANUFACTURED FOOD PRODUCTS 5 1
29 3009 FREIGHT CAR SURPLUS 5 1
30 03016A OPERATING REVENUES OF RAILROADS, PASSENGER 5 0
31 03016B OPERATING REVENUES OF RAILROADS, FREIGHT 5 0
32 4001 WHOLESALE PRICE OF WHEAT, CHICAGO, SIX MARKETS 5 0
33 4005 WHOLESALE PRICE OF CORN, CHICAGO 5 0
34 4006 WHOLESALE PRICE OF COTTON, NEW YORK; 10 MARKETS 5 0
35 4007 WHOLESALE PRICE OF CATTLE, CHICAGO 5 0
36 4008 WHOLESALE PRICE OF HOGS, CHICAGO 5 0
37 4015 WHOLESALE PRICE OF COPPER, ELECTROLYTE, NEW YORK 5 0
38 4017 WHOLESALE PRICE OF PIG LEAD, NEW YORK 5 0
39 4030 WHOLESALE PRICE OF GRANULATED SUGAR 5 0
40 4034 WHOLESALE PRICE OF COFFEE 5 0
41 4048 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 5 0
42 4052 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, ALL ITEMS LESS FOOD 5 0
43 4058 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF FARM PRODUCTS 5 0
44 4061 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF FOODS 5 0
45 4064 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICE OF TEXTILES 5 0
46 4066 WHOLESALE PRICES OF METAL AND METAL PRODUCTS 5 0
47 4068 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF BUILDING MATERIALS 5 0
48 4071 INDEX OF RETAIL PRICES OF FOOD AT HOME 5 0
49 4074 WHOLESALE PRICE OF OATS, CHICAGO 5 0
50 4072 COST OF LIVING INDEX 5 0
51 4079 WHOLESALE PRICE OF CRUDE PETROLEUM, AT WELLS 5 0
52 4092 WHOLESALE PRICE OF SLAB ZINC 5 0
53 4099 WHOLESALE PRICE OF COMMON BRICKS, DOMESTIC, NEW YORK 5 0
54 4128 CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, ALL ITEMS 5 0
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Pos. NBER
Code
Description TC SA
55 4129 WHOLESALE PRICE OF TEA 5 0
56 4134 WHOLESALE PRICE OF STRUCTURAL STEEL 5 0
57 4181 WHOLESALE PRICE OF STEEL RAILS 5 0
58 4189 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF INDUSTRIAL COMMODITIES, BABSON 5 0
59 4202 INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES OF 15 SENSITIVE INDUSTRIAL RAW 5 0
60 06002A INDEX OF DEPARTMENT STORE SALES 5 1
61 06002B THE PHYSICAL VOLUME OF DEPARTMENT STORE SALES 5 1
62 6008 SALES BY GROCERY CHAIN STORES 5 0
63 6009 VARIETY CHAIN STORE SALES, ADJUSTED FOR TREND, PRICE 5 1
64 6029 INDEX OF ORDERS FOR MACHINE TOOLS AND FORGING MACHINERY 5 0
65 6058 INDEX OF TOTAL ADVERTISING 5 1
66 6059 INDEX OF WHOLESALE SALES OF SHOES 5 1
67 7001 DOMESTIC EXPORTS OF CRUDE FOODSTUFFS 5 0
68 7002 DOMESTIC EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURED FOODSTUFFS 5 0
69 7004 DOMESTIC EXPORTS OF SEMI-MANUFACTURES 5 0
70 7005 DOMESTIC EXPORTS OF FINISHED MANUFACTURES 5 0
71 7012 IMPORTS FOR CONSUMPTION OF CRUDE FOOD STUFFS 5 0
72 7013 IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURED FOODSTUFFS 5 0
73 7014 IMPORTS FOR CONSUMPTION OF CRUDE MATERIALS 5 0
74 7015 IMPORTS FOR CONSUMPTION OF SEMI-MANUFACTURES 5 0
75 7016 IMPORTS FOR CONSUMPTION OF FINISHED MANUFACTURES 5 0
76 7023 TOTAL EXPORTS 5 0
77 7028 TOTAL IMPORTS 5 0
78 8010B PRODUCTION WORKER EMPLOYMENT, MANUFACTURING, TOTAL 5 0
79 8014 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, PAPER AND PRINTING 5 1
80 8015 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS 5 1
81 8016 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, STONE, CLAY AND GLASS PRODUCTS 5 1
82 8017 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, LUMBER AND PRODUCTS 5 1
83 8018 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, MACHINERY 5 1
84 8046 AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS, REPRESENTATIVE FACTORIES 5 0
85 8061 INDEX OF COMPOSITE WAGES 5 0
86 8069 INDEX OF AGGREGATE WEEKLY PAYROLLS, PRODUCTION WORKERS TOTAL
MANUFACTURING
5 0
87 8071 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, TEXTILES 5 0
88 8072 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, PAPER AND PRINTING 5 0
89 8073 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS 5 0
90 8074 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, STONE CLAY AND GLASS 5 0
91 8075 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS - LUMBER AND PRODUCTS 5 0
92 8076 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, MACHINERY 5 0
93 8078 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, NEW YORK STATE FACTORIES 5 0
94 8088 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT-BAKING 5 0
95 8101 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, LEATHER AND MANUFACTURES 5 1
96 8104 INDEX OF FACTORY EMPLOYMENT, PAPER AND PULP 5 1
97 8106 INDEX OF EMPLOYMENT, HARDWARE 5 1
98 8110 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, CANE SUGAR REFINING 5 0
99 8112 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, BAKING 5 0
100 8114 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, TOBACCO MANUFACTURES 5 0
101 8145 INDEX OF FACTORY PAYROLLS, AUTOMOBILES 5 0
102 8261 AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS, MANUFACTURING, TOTAL 5 0
103 11001 BOND SALES, PAR VALUE 5 0
104 11005 AMERICAN RAILROAD STOCK PRICES 5 0
105 11009 INDUSTRIAL STOCK PRICE INDEX, DOW-JONES 5 0
106 11025 INDEX OF ALL COMMON STOCK PRICES, COWLES COMMISSION AND S& P
CORPORATION
5 0
107 12002A INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY 5 0
108 12003 INDEX OF AMERICAN BUSINESS ACTIVITY 5 0
109 12004 INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND TRADE 5 1
110 12007 INDEX OF AMERICAN BUSINESS ACTIVITY 5 0
111 12009A INDEX OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY, PITTSBURGH 5 1
112 12009 INDEX OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETINGS 5 1
113 12013 BANK CLEARINGS, DAILY AVERAGE 5 0
114 13001 CALL MONEY RATES, MIXED COLLATERAL 1 0
115 13002 COMMERCIAL PAPER RATES, NEW YORK CITY 5 0
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Code
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116 13003 NINETY DAY TIME-MONEY RATES ON STOCK EXCHANGE LOANS 1 0
117 13004 RATES ON CUSTOMER LOANS, NEW YORK CITY 1 0
118 13005 RATES ON CUSTOMERS LOANS, NORTHERN AND WESTERN CITIES 1 0
119 13006 BANK RATES ON CUSTOMERS LOANS, SOUTHERN AND WESTERN CITIES 1 0
120 13007 BANKER S ACCEPTANCE RATES, NEW YORK CITY 1 0
121 13008 INTEREST RATES ON FEDERAL LAND BANK LOANS, TWELVE FEDERAL
LAND BANKS
1 0
122 13009 DISCOUNT RATES, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK 1 0
123 13010 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK DISCOUNT RATES, MINNEAPOLIS 1 0
124 13011 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK DISCOUNT RATE, DALLAS 1 0
125 13021 INDEX OF YIELDS OF HIGH GRADE CORPORATE AND MUNICIPAL BONDS 1 0
126 13023 INDEX OF YIELDS OF HIGH GRADE MUNICIPAL BONDS 1 0
127 13024 YIELDS OF HIGH GRADE RAILROAD BONDS 1 0
128 13025 INDEX OF YIELDS OF HIGH GRADE PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS 1 0
129 13026 YIELD ON HIGH GRADE INDUSTRIAL BONDS, AAA RATING 1 0
130 13030 WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF OPEN MARKET RATES, NEW YORK CITY 1 0
131 13031 BANK RATES ON CUSTOMER LOANS, LEADING CITIES 1 0
132 13032 TOTAL RATES CHARGED CUSTOMERS AND OPEN MARKET RATES, COM-
BINED
1 0
133 13033 YIELD ON LONG-TERM UNITED STATES BONDS 1 0
134 13035 YIELDS ON CORPORATE BONDS, HIGHEST RATING 1 0
135 13036 YIELDS ON CORPORATE BONDS, LOWEST RATING 1 0
136 13048 DIVIDEND YIELD OF PREFERRED STOCK ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EX-
CHANGE
1 0
137 14062 TOTAL GOLD RESERVES OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
138 14063 CASH RESERVES OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
139 14064 RESERVES HELD AT FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS, ALL MEMBER BANKS 5 0
140 14065 NOTES IN CIRCULATION, FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
141 14066 TOTAL BILLS AND SECURITIES HELD BY FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
142 14067 BILLS DISCOUNTED, FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
143 14069 GOVERNMENT SECURITIES HELD, FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
144 14070 TOTAL DEPOSITS, FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
145 14072 RATIO OF RESERVES TO NOTE AND DEPOSIT LIABILITIES, FEDERAL RESERVE
BANKS
5 0
146 14076 MONETARY GOLD STOCK 5 0
147 14078 NET DEMAND DEPOSITS, REPORTING MEMBER BANKS, FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM
5 0
148 14079 TIME DEPOSITS, REPORTING MEMBER BANKS, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 5 0
149 14080 CURRENCY HELD BY THE TREASURY 5 1
150 14086 PERCENTAGE OF RESERVES HELD TO RESERVES REQUIRED, ALL MEMBER
BANKS, FRB SYSTEM
5 0
151 14121 NEW YORK CITY 5 0
152 14126 VAULT CASH, ALL BANKS EXCEPT FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS 5 0
153 14127 INVESTMENTS OTHER THAN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES,
REPORTING FEDERAL RESERVE MEMBER BANKS IN 101 LEADING CITIES
5 0
154 14135 TOTAL CURRENCY OUTSIDE THE TREASURY AND FEDERAL RESERVE
BANKS, END OF MONTH
5 0
155 14137 GOLD HELD IN THE TREASURY AND FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS, END OF 5 0
156 14144 MONEY STOCK, COMMERICAL BANKS PLUS CURRENCY HELD BY PUBLIC 5 0
157 14145 TOTAL DEPOSITS, ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS 5 1
158 14172 ADJUSTED DEMAND DEPOSITS, ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS 5 1
159 14173 DEPOSITS IN MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS AND POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEM, END
OF MONTH
5 0
160 14174 ADJ. DEMAND DEPOSITS, ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS,CURRENCY HELD BY
PUBLIC
5 1
161 14175 ADJ. DEMAND DEPOSITS, ALL BANKS,TOTAL TIME DEPOSITS, CURRENCY
HELD BY PUBLIC
5 1
162 14178 RATIO OF CURRENCY HELD BY THE PUBLIC TO ADJUSTED DEMAND DE-
POSITS, TIME DEPOSITS, ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS, PLUS CURRENCY HELD
BY THE PUBLIC
5 1
163 14190 PERCENT CHANGE IN TOTAL MONEY SUPPLY, MONTH-TO-MONTH
CHANGE
1 1
164 14195 MONEY STOCK, MONTH-TO-MONTH CHANGE 1
SA = 0: no seasonal adjustment or SA in the source; SA = 1: seasonally adjusted by the
authors. TC = 1: no transformation; TC = 5: 1st difference of logs.
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C Tables
Table 3: Estimated R2s from regressions of individual series on FAVAR (DR
model).
Description R2 Description R2
PR IMNF 1 Production (durable mnfct) 0.71
CPI 1 Industrial Production/Trade 0.69
DR 1 Industrial activity 0.68
Total rates charged 1 Business activity growth 0.67
Bankers rates (Customer loans) 1 Index of WSP: 0.61
Open market rates 0.99 WSP: Foods 0.6
CommPR 0.99 General price level 0.56
Yield:Corporate bonds 0.99 Employment: Machinery 0.54
Yields: Corporate bonds 0.99 CPI less food 0.53
Rates on custom. Loans 0.99 PR IPTG 0.53
Rates on custom. Loans (SW) 0.99 Pig Iron 0.51
90day time to money 0.99 Employment: Manufacturing 0.51
Rates on custom. Loans (NW) 0.99 Business activity pittsburgh 0.5
Yields: Public utility 0.98 Index manufacturing prod. 0.5
Banker s accept. Rate 0.98 Steel ingot 0.5
DR Dallas 0.98 Cost of Living index 0.49
DR SF 0.97 Payrolls wkly: Manufacturing 0.49
DR Minneapolis 0.96 Factory payrolls: Machinery 0.49
Yields: Industrial bonds 0.96 Factory payrolls: steel 0.47
Call money rate 0.95 Employment: Steel 0.47
Yield: Long-term bonds 0.95 PR IPDCG 0.45
Yields: Railroad bonds 0.95 WSP Industrial (sensitive Raw) 0.44
Dividend yields 0.95 WSP: Textiles 0.44
Yields: Munic Interest rates FED
bank loans 0.91 PR IPCGLA 0.4
PR IPRGD 0.88 Employment: Paper 0.39
WSP: food 0.87 WSP Industrial commodities 0.39
PR IPDG 0.81 Employment: Lumber 0.37
Yield:Corporate bonds (LG) 0.78 WSP: Building material 0.37
Index business activity 0.77 Employment: Steel 0.37
Data show the variance decomposition of the factors through the estimated R2s for each
indicator series based on 4 extracted factors.
34
Table 4: Forecast error variance decomposition of a contractionary monetary
policy shock
Commercial Paper Rate Model
Horizon 0 1 2 3 6 12 24 48
CommPR 5 6 7 7 6 6 5 5
FRB Industrial Production 5 6 8 8 8 9 9 10
CPI inflation 65 48 46 44 43 43 43 42
S&P 500 9 11 13 14 15 15 16 16
Wages 12 14 15 15 15 15 16 16
Orders of Machinery Tools 9 13 14 18 18 20 20 20
Discount Rate Model
Horizon 0 1 2 3 6 12 24 48
Discount Rate 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6
FRB Industrial Production 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 9
CPI inflation 94 56 53 52 48 46 45 43
S&P 500 5 6 6 7 8 9 9 10
Wages 10 11 11 11 11 12 12 13
Orders of Machinery Tools 6 7 7 9 10 10 11 11
M0 Model
Horizon 0 1 2 3 6 12 24 48
M0 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3
FRB Industrial Production 15 18 19 18 18 20 21 20
CPI inflation 54 38 38 37 37 37 36 35
S&P 500 16 18 20 22 22 22 22 21
Wages 10 10 12 12 12 13 12 12
Orders of Machinery Tools 18 17 20 23 23 23 23 22
M1 Model
Horizon 0 1 2 3 6 12 24 48
M1 17 19 19 18 17 18 17 16
FRB Industrial Production 16 17 17 17 17 17 16 16
CPI inflation 89 60 55 54 50 48 47 42
S&P 500 19 20 21 22 22 22 23 23
Wages 16 17 18 18 17 17 16 16
Orders of Machinery Tools 22 23 26 27 26 26 26 27
M2 Model
Horizon 0 1 2 3 6 12 24 48
M2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3
FRB Industrial Production 4 4 5 6 6 6 7 7
CPI inflation 87 48 45 40 38 37 37 36
S&P 500 5 6 6 8 8 9 9 10
Wages 10 9 11 10 11 10 11 11
Orders of Machinery Tools 7 7 8 9 10 11 11 12
Percentage forecast error variance decompositions of a contractionary monetary policy shock for
the 3 models considered. The respective 3 blocks report the results for the discount rate model,
commercial paper rates model, M0 model the M1 model and the M2 model. The variables consid-
ered are the same as for the impulse response analysis, namely the Discount Rate, the commercial
Paper rate, the growth in FRB index for production in manufacturing, the CPI inflation, S&P
is the Standard and Poor 500 index and the index of orders in Machinery and Tools. The values
denote the variance explained in the respective series due to a monetary policy shock in percent
based on the median of the posterior draws.
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D Figures, Whole Observation Period 1919-1939
D.1 Reduced Form Results
Figure 1: Extracted Factors with 95% probability bands
In order to access the uncertainty associated with the sampled posterior factors we report the
95 % probability bands around the posterior median of the respective sampled factors. These
are fairly tight indicating a low degree of sampling uncertainty. We furthermore checked the
convergence by monitoring the sampler visually through trace plots. Figure (3)) shows how the
parameter estimates evolve in the sampling process and helps to check whether there are jumps
in the level of the respective parameter. Furthermore we plotted the first half of the kept draws
against the second half to check whether the sampler has converged and whether the whole
density of the distribution is represented. Figure (2) shows hardly any deviation, suggesting
that the sampler converged already in the first half.
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D.2 The Surprise Component of Monetary Policy
Figure 4: IRF and FEVD to Monetary Policy Shock, DR model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
43
Figure 5: IRF and FEVD to Monetary Policy Shock, CommPR model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
44
Figure 6: IRF and FEVD to Monetary Policy Shock, M0 model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 7: IRF and FEVD to a Monetary Policy Shock in the M1 model for
Fullsample Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02 identified with sign restriction
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Figure 8: IRF and FEVD to a Monetary Policy Shock in the M2 model for
Fullsample Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02 identified with sign restriction
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D.3 Identifying the Monetary Policy Reaction Function
Figure 9: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Supply Shock, DR model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
48
Figure 10: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Supply Shock, CommPR model, Full
Sample Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
49
Figure 11: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Supply Shock, M0 model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
50
Figure 12: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Supply Shock, M1 model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 13: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Supply Shock, M2 model, Full Sample
Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
52
Figure 14: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Demand Shock, DR model, Full Sam-
ple Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 15: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Demand Shock, CommPR model, Full
Sample Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 16: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Demand Shock, M0 model, Full Sam-
ple Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 17: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Demand Shock, M1 model, Full Sam-
ple Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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Figure 18: IRF and FEVD to an Aggregate Demand Shock, M2 model, Full Sam-
ple Period: 1919:02 - 1939:02, identified by sign restrictions
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